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Applications of the framework of behavioral economics to questions arising
from urban economics are discussed. Directions for future research are outlined.
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1 Introduction1
1.1 Context
A number of fads from economics have percolated to regional science. Some have
resulted in new insights, some have not. It is not clear to anyone at the beginning
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whether these ideas end up as fads or whether they end up a¤ecting research in a
substantial way. For example, game theory began as something of a fad (the reader
might be too young to remember) studied by a small but devoted set of researchers;
it was not even taught as a part of the core micro sequence when I was a rst year
Ph.D. student at Berkeley, one of the places to go to learn theory back in the dark
ages. But now it is used by most everyone, and comprises about half of the core micro
theory sequence here at Washington University in St. Louis. The New Economic
Geography began as something of a fad developed by a small set of researchers, but
ended up contributing greatly to the development of regional science.
Regional science has had close encounters with some fads that have not had staying
power in the study of urban questions, such as computational economics, fractals,
chaos and catastrophe theory.
Why have some fads met with success in regional science, and why have some
failed? To address this question before getting into the meat of this paper, namely
the potential impact of the behavioral economics fad on regional science, it is of
utmost importance next to compare and contrast the methodology used in economics
and regional science.
1.2 Methodology
There is methodology used in regional science, even contemporary regional science,
that was settled as unreasonable by economists many years ago, justiably so in
my opinion. At a supercial level, economists require that models of markets be
consistent with the use of prices (wages and rents) and with the optimizing behavior
of agents. This applies whether the work is empirical or theoretical. Regional
scientists seem oblivious to this, often using models implying that people (including
themselves) dont care about the price of a house when they buy it, or models where
non-zero price elasticities would falsify their theory. Moreover, as I have learned over
the course of many years, regional scientists have issues with basics in economics such
as supply and demand, and are in denial about it.2
2Thus, as I found out when serving as a discussant for the Presidential Address of the RSAI in
2007, a transformative developmentfor regional scientists would be understanding the construction
of supply and demand curves, and the meaning of perfect competition. Regional scientists embed
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At a deeper level, economists generally adhere to scientic method. Economists
take an interesting question motivated by observations, write down a model to address
it, and then nd the mathematics appropriate to apply to the model to answer the
question. The empirical implications are then taken to data.
In contrast with their application in economics, applications of fads to regional
science were motivated by excitement over the fad, often an area of applied mathe-
matics, rather than motivation by economic questions that in turn generate models
that require the application of this sort of mathematics. But I have harped on
that elsewhere (see Berliant and ten Raa, 1994). One no longer sees sessions at re-
gional science meetings or issues of regional science journals devoted to applications
of computation, fractals, chaos and catastrophe theory. No wonder.3 A related phe-
nomenon, apparent at the 2008 Regional Science Association meetings in Brooklyn, is
that no matter the question, it must be addressed with a New Economic Geography
model. This is, no doubt, a direct result of the 2008 Nobel prize in economics.
The stark di¤erence here is in the use of scientic method, and the stage at which
mathematics is brought into the research process. If the mathematics or a particular
model itself is the motivation for the work, working backwards from the mathematics
to obtain the economic assumptions usually results in nonsense. This is how and
why fads in regional science bite the dust.
At mainstream economics departments, the scientic method as applied to eco-
nomics is an important part of training graduate students. In fact, that is the topic
of the standard rst lecture in a core graduate micro course. The reasons why mathe-
matics is used by economists is not the subject of this essay; see Weintraub (2002) for
more. But I shall nevertheless take this opportunity to express my frustration with
many regional scientists about both their understanding of how and why mathemat-
ics is used in economics, and their misconceptions about basic economics, throwing
market clearing conditions in the optimization problems of agents, a mistake usually reserved for
undergraduates. So I ended up talking about material freshmen learn in my discussion of the
Presidential Address. Another transformative developmentwould be if they learned about adverse
selection and moral hazard; that is a subject for another essay/rant. But Savannah was nice in
November.
3Some of these mathematical techniques are used in economics, but the motivation for their use
di¤ers from the motivation for their use in regional science.
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jargon around in meaningless ways to try to impress. My goal here is not to rename
the eld regional art, though it does have a nice ring to it.4 I am hopeful that
younger scholars will not follow in the footsteps of their elders.5
As can be seen in journals and at meetings, regional scientists seem oblivious to
controversies that currently rage in economics. In contemporary economic research,
there are clear controversies over empirical methodologies, namely whether one uses
structural models, reduced form models, or calibration. There are some new fads,
such as experimental economics, neuroeconomics, and behavioral economics, that
might or might not have a long run impact on the eld, but that regional science
should at least be made aware of. The past for economics is often the future for
regional science.
The use of behavioral ideas in economics springs not from their popularity or
mathematical elegance; rather, it comes from either anomalies in data or in casual
observations that are not captured by classical theory. I am hoping, but not opti-
mistic, that the application of behavioral ideas to regional science will take a similar
scientic rather than artistic tack. Realistically, I expect that the ideas will be
brought in wholesale from economics and shoved into regional science (e.g. New
Economic Geography) models, whether the assumptions and motivating questions (if
any) make sense in this new context or not.
Simply put, the goal of this essay is to bring one of the controversies currently
raging in economics to the doorstep of regional science. I shall discuss some of
the motivating questions that are important for regional science to consider before
diving head rst into the behavioral point of view. I shall also discuss my view
of behavioral economics and its implications for regional science. Although it is
interesting to speculate about whether it is just a fad or something more substantial,
in technical terms whether or not it will nuke the fridge,Im going to leave that to
the reader. But before getting into its application to regional science, we must rst
digress: What is behavioral economics?
4Thus, the readers of this journal are regional artists.
5Some economists enjoy singing Kumbaya with the regional artists, but if the latter are ad-
dressing economic questions without understanding economics, and are in denial, then singing is
counterproductive.
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2 Behavioral Economics
I shall not attempt even a partial literature review here, but in general, behavioral
economics looks at decisions, either theoretically, empirically, or in the lab, where
context or situation (Glaeser, 2004) matters. Rustichini (2008, p. F248) makes
a nice attempt to dene the eld: Behavioral economics may be dened as the
research programme striving to give a psychologically realistic basis to the theory
of economic behavior. Examples are: loss aversion, where a reference point such
as current wealth has an e¤ect on a persons evaluation of well-being under various
scenarios; the endowment e¤ect, where actually owning an item rather than having
a budget creates greater attachment to the item; non-classical discounting that gives
greater weight to the present than is possible under classical discounting; and various
forms of altruism or envy. I should note that in the classical market setting, most of
these possibilities were incorporated into general equilibrium theory many years ago.
One of my favorite articles on this subject is Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975), that
species a full blown general equilibrium model (with externalities and production)
where preferences are only required to be irreexive, namely no bundle is preferred
to itself, continuous and convex. This paper gives the entire model, examples, and
demonstrates existence of equilibrium in four pages. The assumption of convexity of
preferences was of course dispensed with in large economies even before this. As I tell
my rst year graduate students, expected utility (for example) is not a requirement of
the theory, but is useful in applications in some circumstances. General equilibrium
theory has, with few exceptions, never required expected utility functions, or even a
utility function!
Now consider a theory that is consistent with standard behavior and utility theory,
but not an expected utility theory. One such theory is that of ambiguity aversion (e.g.
Maccheroni et al, 2006). This theory allows one person simultaneously to have many
ideas of the distribution of a random variable, for example utility levels or welfare in
cities, and specializes to expected utility theory when there is only one distribution.
A special case is the pessimistic person, who thinks that nature always chooses the
worst case distribution for them (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). In technical terms,
these ideas are called unexpected utility theory.
For our application to urban economics in the next section, it is useful to distin-
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guish between decisions that a particular agent might consider to be big, such as the
choice of city by a consumer or a rm, and decisions that a particular agent might
consider to be small, such as the choice of input supplier by a rm. The small de-
cisions made by individuals can add up (across agents) to something much bigger.
They might be the underpinnings of important phenomena, such as agglomeration
economies; see for example Helsley and Strange (2002). However, the consistency
of these small decisions with particular theories might be di¢ cult to tease out in
individual data, as agents might be satiscing. The choice might not matter much to
any one of them. Thus, we focus on the big decisions.
Due to the presence of many other factors (to be discussed shortly) that can cause
apparently anomalous behavior, to isolate the choice problem from these other fac-
tors, testing has been moved from the classical laboratory of the real world to the
experimental lab. Thus, the thrust of the empirical tests of behavioral theories has
been to isolate them in so-called context free environments. But this is troublesome
for a couple of reasons. First, it is hard to actually implement a context free en-
vironment in the lab. Second, it is often context that is important in behavioral
theories.
Some experimental studies have their focus on context, for example studying how
a societys culture, market interactions and social interactions a¤ect decisions. For
small decisions, Roth et al (1991) and Henrich et al (2001) tell us that there might be
something behavioral in the data, though it is not clear what it is and how situational
e¤ects are identied, as opposed to subjects misunderstanding the context of the
experiment or using analogies to more complex real world situations that can be
explained by standard decision or game theory. Plott and Zeiler (2005) can explain
anomalous behavior in the lab by subject misconceptions arising from di¤erences
in the instructions given to subjects and di¤erences in experimental design. The
residual seems to be ambiguity aversion.
I confess that due at least in part to my training, I am a fan of the critics of
the literature such as Rubinstein (2006) rather than of the literature itself. As
already mentioned, the theories of preferences and general equilibrium do not exclude
externalities, for instance, so if they are found to occur, it is unfair to say that we
must reject our standard theories. Cox et al. (2007) show that if externalities are
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introduced so that a persons well-being depends on their relative status and the
reciprocity of others (in the form of prior actions) as well as on their own income,
then many apparent anomalies in experimental data can be explained.
If there is something to behavioral economics, we should consider revising our
theories, of course. But this does not mean throwing the baby out with the bath
water;6 see Binmore (2008). It does not necessarily imply, for example, that we
should not be using supply and demand (correctly) in a classical competitive market.
Rather, it might imply changes in the theory in certain contexts. It is possible
that these are at the fringes of applications of the theory, or are small enough in
magnitude for large markets that the classical theory works well enough, perhaps due
to aggregation across agents.7 But we dont know. In any case, careful and scientic
reading of the evidence does not imply that: the whole theory should be scrapped and
replaced with something else, preferably not involving economists at all. Regional
scientists seem to rejoice at the latter prospect, since it means they dont have to
learn basic economics. But in my opinion, youve got to know something to criticize
it.8
When an agent makes a smaller decision, satiscing could easily be prevalent,
as the agent doesnt care much about the outcome and thus doesnt invest much in
the decision-making process. Thus, individual data on small decisions could be very
noisy. When an agent makes a big decision of the type considered in the next section,
such as location choice, satiscing is unlikely to be prevalent because a mistake could
be costly to the agent. So at least the magnitude of behavioral e¤ects should be
measurable, in other words greater than epsilon, if they are present.
6For an explanation of this idiom and its origins, see http://www.answers.com/topic/throw-out-
the-baby-with-the-bath-water
7The technical term is smoothing by aggravation.
8There are several ways (equivalent in e¤ectiveness) in which regional artists can cause economists
to tune them out: 1) Tell economists to go away. 2) Make mistakes in basic economics, followed
by denials. 3) Advance uninformed criticisms of economics, followed by denials. 4) Advocate
technique-driven research.
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3 Misbehavior in Urban Economies
Storper and Manville (2006, footnote 13) lament that behavioral economics has not
made its way into the urban literature.9 However, it is very important to have specic
ideas and questions in mind when considering this issue. I provide some next.
In the general setting, behavioral e¤ects would be observable in the decisions of
agents. Evidently, we are talking about the optimization problems of consumers and
producers. What is special about the urban setting, as opposed to the setting in
general economics, is the choice of location embedded in agentsoptimization prob-
lems. To make matters more concrete, let us focus on consumers instead of rms.
Some of behavioral economics (but not all) involves consumer behavior when facing
uncertainty. The decision to change cities is a very good example of this.
When people consider moving or actually move to a new city, there generally
remains much uncertainty about their new circumstances, for example their com-
mute, their neighborhood and their schools. Although much information can be
gleaned from the internet and from current residents, the residual uncertainty can be
substantial. Given that there is less uncertainty associated with their current resi-
dence, a reluctance to move is understandable. The reasons include risk aversion and
ambiguity aversion. The extant literature in urban economics, both empirical and
theoretical, does not deal well with this kind of uncertainty. In general, it is simply
assumed not to exist. What are its implications for the way we look at cities?
Relegating the choice of bundles of mobile commodities to the background, do we
observe behavioral e¤ects in migration choices? In other words, do people migrate less
often than is predicted by standard models? Is such stickiness due to the presence of
uncertainty, in the sense that there are unknowns about cities other than the location
of residence that, in combination with risk aversion or ambiguity aversion, cause
people to move less? Or are there situational e¤ects, as Glaeser (2004) calls them,
9It is impossible for me to read this article and not observe its collision with economic theory
as taught in rst year micro Ph.D. courses. We illustrate using the following examples. 1) The
article discusses indivisibilities in location and housing, nonconvexities in preferences, and lack of
transitivity of preferences as if they pose insurmountable obstacles, when in fact general equilibrium
theory has allowed all of these features for at least 30 years. No problem. 2) The article discusses
preference aggregation without mentioning Arrows theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem,
and the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem.
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that might cause stickiness in the migration decisions of households? Here I refer to
loss aversion and endowment e¤ects, for example.
There is some preliminary evidence of loss aversion in the context of real estate
markets; see Genesove and Mayer (2001) and Ong et al (2007). This research ad-
dresses listing prices of houses and default decisions, but not decisions such as whether
or not to sell a house at all or move to another city.
Similar to applications of behavioral economics in other elds, in urban economics
it is hard to isolate behavioral e¤ects from unobservable variables, such as moving cost,
preferences for amenities, social networks, and the aforementioned risk and ambiguity
aversion. In other words, it is hard to isolate the e¤ects of interest from noise. In
contrast with the general literature on tests of behavioral theories, urban economics
is not context free. In fact, it is all about context, namely ones surroundings. So
the experiment that would follow naturally, not context free, is to compare in the
lab decisions of consumers without the endowment of a house and location (but just
a budget, like a new migrant to a country), and consumers who are identical but
endowed with a house in a community. One could also look at real world data, for
example comparing locations chosen by new immigrants to a country with locations
chosen by people already resident in a country, though the controls would have to be
extensive. In other words, are location decisions sticky, and if so, why? If they are
sticky, there might be a role for government to improve ex post welfare by subsidizing
moves through the tax system. There are also applications to quality of life indices,
that rely on no uncertainty in their calculation. Uncertainty itself under expected
utility will add a little, as its equivalent to a moving cost, namely the risk premium.
But ambiguity aversion will add more, as I shall explain below. Let me be more
specic about an example.
What are the implications of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion for the way
we look at cities? Consider rst a standard equilibrium model of cities, e.g. Eeck-
hout (2004). Suppose for simplicity of exposition that all people are identical. The
standard model has no uncertainty or moving costs. Then people will move to the
city where they are happiest. Those cities that o¤er a lower level of happiness will
be empty.10 The resulting equilibrium allocation might not be rst best due to
10For the regional artists out there, all of these arguments apply whether or not there are prices,
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externalities.
Now add to the model uncertainty about circumstances in cities other than the
city of initial residence. It will not matter, in the end, whether people are risk averse
or not. The result will be the same as the previous one. Here is why. Consider people
in the city generating the lowest, or close to the lowest, level of happiness. As in the
case without uncertainty, they know that any other city will generate a higher level,
at least in expected utility, though they might not know the happiness level for each
particular city. So that unhappy city will empty. This process will continue until only
the cities at the top of the distribution are left, and all consumers know that. Thus,
under the assumptions of the standard model, and using expected utility theory, only
the top cities survive.
Now consider a theory that is consistent with standard behavior and utility theory,
but one based on ambiguity aversion.
We conjecture that in this situation, many non-degenerate distributions of (welfare
in) cities can be supported as equilibria. The reason is that pessimistic people do not
think that moving will make them happier, so they stay put in the city that they
know and never learn about other cities. Cities with relatively unhappy residents do
not empty. Such agents are fearful of moving because they believe that the city they
move to could be worse than their current city of residence.
There are applications of this idea to the welfare economics of systems of cities
and to explaining the size distribution of cities as well as to the interpretation of
quality of life indices.
4 Conclusions
Are the location decisions of rms and consumers sticky, and if so, why? This seems
to be a critical question in the future of misbehavioral urban economics. It can be
addressed theoretically, empirically, or in the lab. The goal of this essay is to provoke
on several levels, not to provide answers.
namely wages and land rents, in the model. But the equilibria will be di¤erent depending on
whether or not there are prices.
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